

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 15 October, 1943 - File No. 10
[2012]

7

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	reports	Spot Reports	10/15/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Jidda to Sec State	10/15/73	B
3	telegram	Amemb Madrid to Sec State	10/15/73	B
4	telegram	Sec State to Amemb Amman	10/15/73	B
5	report	Intelligence Information Cable	10/16/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1174	

FOLDER TITLE

(7)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.



Department of State

Way
TELEGRAM

SECRET 338

PAGE 01 STATE 203698

54

741014 SS-20

INFO OCT-71 AF-10 NEA-10 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSU-00 NSCE-00

CCO-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

4-73 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SPC-73 ACDA-19 IO-14 MC-02 /143 R

60644

DRAFTED BY S/S:JRPICKERING:AL

10/15/73 EXT. 22540

APPROVED BY S/S:THOMAS R. PICKERING

THE SECRETARY (SUBSTANCE)

HEAD MR. SISCO

105365

Z 0 151229Z OCT 73 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS FLASH

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE

ISDEL SALT TWO GENEVA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 203698

FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES FROM SECRETARY

KUWAIT ALSO PASS DOHA

F.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UGEN

SUBJECT: PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS

REF: STATE 203684 (NOTAL)

STATE 203685

*State instructions
on resupply*

U.S. RE-SUPPLY EFFORTS REFERRED TO REFTEL NOT YET PUBLIC
IN U.S. PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST
GOVERNMENTS DO NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE THIS

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 243698

INFORMATION BECOMES GENERALLY PUBLIC FOR THEM AS INDICATED
REFTELS. DEPT WILL LET YOU KNOW WHEN YOU ARE FREE TO
TALK ABOUT THE MATTER WITH YOUR GOVERNMENTS. KISSINGER

SECRET

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S/S (3)
S/S-I
S/S-M
S/S-S
S/PC
H

NEA

EB

EUR

IO

AF

AF/N

S/PRS

D/WLG

PM

INR

NH (LDX)

DOD (LDX)

CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

PA/HO

L

S/CCT

SCA

SY

SCI

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 33

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT, Oct. 15, 1973

Military Situation

There was relatively little significant military action this afternoon on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. In Syria, the front remains stable, and in the Sinai the Egyptians are consolidating their position. There were, however, a large number of Israeli air sorties on both fronts. An IDF spokesman stated that the Israelis repulsed an Egyptian amphibious attack on an Israeli outpost on the Mediterranean east of the Suez Canal. The IDF also claimed to have broken through Iraqi positions and advanced another two miles into Syria, but we have received no confirmation of those claims. The IDF described the situation as "a slow, steady advance" aimed at causing maximum Syrian losses.

Embassy Amman reported a BBC story that Jordan announced a clash between their forces and the IDF, with six IDF tanks knocked out. We have no IDF confirmation, however, that it has made military contact with the Jordanians.

Political Situation

There is not yet any significant reporting on reactions to the Department's announcement today of the U.S. resupply effort for Israel, although there is heavy news agency reporting on the announcement itself.

The Department has begun to receive a heavy volume of telephone calls from private citizens expressing concern over the U.S. military resupply effort.


SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 21, 1981

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

SECRET 799

2

PAGE 01 JIDDA 04516 151805Z

44

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

0 151000Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 5196
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DHAKHAN NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI NIACI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NY NIACI IMMEDIATE

SECRET JIDDA 4516

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

DEPT PASS BAGHDAD

F.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, US

SUBJ: U.S. RESPONSE TO SAUDI RETALIATION

SUMMARY: IF SAUDIS RETALIATE AGAINST U.S. OIL
INTERESTS IN RESPONSE TO OUR AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL,
WE SHOULD NOT RESPOND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP
UNHELPFUL DIALOGUE GOING ANOTHER ROUND. END SUMMARY

1. WILL PRESENT SECRETARY'S LETTER ON U.S. AIR-
LIFT TO ISRAEL TO PRINCE NAWWAF AND DR. PHARAON
SOMETIME MORNING OF OCTOBER 15. WHEN DIWAN LEARNED
OF LETTER THEY ASKED TO WHOM DID I WISH TO PRESENT
IT? I REPLIED PRINCE NAWWAF. I THINK CHANCES OF A

ANDERSON _____
BROOKS _____
HO _____
JOHN _____
LEAH _____
LEWIS _____
NEC OPPOSITE _____
RATLEY _____
ROSE _____
SOMERSET _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

108377

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(4)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
PAGE 02 JIDDA 04516 151803Z

SOFT LANDING BETTER FOR SECRETARY'S MESSAGE IF
NAWWAF AND PHARAON HEAR IT FIRST AND HAVE CHANCE
TO REFLECT ON IT. THEY WILL BE UNHAPPY WITH NEWS,
BUT NOT AS MUCH AS KING, AND IT MAY BE JUST AS WELL
USG NOT FORCED TO REGISTER WHAT MAY BE HIS INITIAL
EMOTIONAL REACTION.

2. BELIEVE IT MORE THAN LIKELY THAT SAG WILL FEEL--
ON BASIS OF PREVIOUS URGINGS AND A MORE AROUSED ARAB
PUBLIC OPINION--TO TAKE SOME RETAILATORY ACTION. THIS
COULD BE EITHER AT LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION,
OUR EXTENSIVE MILITARY/SECURITY PROGRAMS, OR OIL. WE
THINK SAUDIS WILL COME DOWN WITH SOME GESTURE IN OIL
DEPARTMENT. (KUWAIT OIL MEETING COMES AT BAD TIME.)
OF THREE CHOICES, OIL IS THE ONE MOST CONSONANT WITH
NATURE OF ARAB CRIES FOR ACTION, AND WOULD HAVE
LEAST IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON U.S. TTES AND INTERNAL
SECURITY SITUATION. SAUDI REACTION MAY TAKE FORM
OF ANNOUNCEMENT IMPOSITION OF CUTBACK OR CEILING
ON PRODUCTION. IF THIS HAPPENS, STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT
WE SHOULD PLAY IT COOL. WE SHOULD NOT--BY SOUNDING
OUTRAGED OR AGGRIEVED--KEEP AN UNHELPFUL DIALOGUE
GOING IN ANOTHER EXCHANGE.
HORAN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED BAGHDAD.

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Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 159

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ~~CODE-00~~ CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W (4)

0 152105Z OCT 73 ZFF4

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SFCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 206

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 3931

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PINK MILT XF UN SY

SUBJ: SYRIAN CONVERSATION WITH SYG

REF: USUN 3922

1. SYG TELEPHONED AMBASSADOR SCALI AT 3 P.M. TO SAY HE HAD HAD ANOTHER VISIT FROM SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN AT 12:45 P.M. HE SAID TO SYG HE IN FOLLOW-UP TO HIS OCTOBER 14 CALL, HAD CONFIRMATION FROM HIS GOVERNMENT THAT SYRIAN FORCES HAD NOW SHOT DOWN TWO PHANTOM AIRCRAFT WITHOUT INSIGNIA OR EMBLEMS, BOTH BEING FLOWN BY AMERICAN PILOTS. HE FURTHER MENTIONED SYRIAN GOVERNMENT REPORTS OF FIFTY PHANTOMS TRANSFERRED FROM U.S. INVENTORIES IN GERMANY (HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THESE AIRCRAFT WERE ALREADY IN THE FIGHT OR NOT), TOGETHER WITH 150 AMERICANS ARRIVING IN ISRAEL FROM GERMANY TO SERVE AS PILOTS AND TECHNICIANS. ACCORDING TO SYG, SYRIAN DID NOT ALLEGE USAF PARTICIPATING BUT DESCRIBED THEM AS VOLUNTEER PILOTS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP, AMERICAN MERCENARIES FLYING PHANTOMS NOT MARKED AS OF ISRAELI AIR FORCE.

2. SCALI EMPHASIZED EARLIER OFFICIAL USG DENIALS OF PARTICIPATION IN MIDDLE EAST WAR BY AMERICAN PLANS OR PILOTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED POSSIBILITY OF VOLUNTEERS, BUT STRESSED TO SYG THAT USG WAS NOT ONLY NOT ENCOURAGING U.S.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

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CITIZENS TO VOLUNTEER BUT WAS ACTIVELY DISCOURAGING SUCH VOLUNTEER ACTIVITIES. SCALI EMPHASIZED HE KNEW OF NO US VOLUNTEERS CURRENTLY ACTIVE ON EITHER WAR FRONT. SCALI WENT ON TO EXPLAIN NOON ANNOUNCEMENT RE US ACTION IN SUPPLYING MATERIAL TO ISRAEL TO OFFSET MASSIVE SOVIET AIRLIFT.

3. SYG ACKNOWLEDGED POINTS MADE BY SCALI AND SAID HE HAD CALLED IN ORDER TO LET US KNOW WHAT THE ARABS WERE SAYING. IN CONTRAST TO LOW-KEY APPROACH OF SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN IN REPORTING OCTOBER 14 CALL ON SYG, SYRIAN WAS IN EXCITED MOOD TODAY.

4. SYG SAID HE HAD ASKED SYRIAN VIEWS RE ANOTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. ISMAIL HAD RESPONDED SYRIA NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT CEASE FIRE WITHOUT A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TO PRE-67 BOUNDARIES. THIS WAS SAME POSITION EL-ZAYYAT HAD TAKEN WITH SYG LAST FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12. SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN HAD SAID ARABS WERE UNITED THIS TIME AND THIS WAS WAR OF ALL ARABS AGAINST ISRAEL. FEROCIOUS FIGHTING WAS GOING ON WITH ISRAELIS GAINING HERE AND THERE AND SYRIANS ALSO GAINING HERE AND THERE. US MASS MEDIA, SAID ISMAIL, IS QUITE INCORRECT IN ITS REPORTING OF ISRAELI SUCCESSES IN SYRIA. HE DECLARED DAMASCUS WOULD FALL ONLY WHEN THE LAST SYRIAN WAS DEAD. NO STAND-STILL CEASE FIRE WOULD BE ACCEPTED. SYG DESCRIBED SYRIAN AS VERY REPEAT VERY FIRM IN HIS MANNER, THE SAME AS EL-ZAYYAT LAST FRIDAY.

5. SYG SAID HE WAS DEEPLY WORRIED. AT THIS STAGE HE CAN ONLY FORESEE A LONG WAR AND HE RECOGNIZES THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION WITHOUT FURTHER FIGHTING. THE RISK OF GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT GROWS ALL THE TIME. SCALI SAID HE SHARED SYG'S CONCERN, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT USG COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO POUR IN MATERIAL TO ARABS. SYG AND SCALI AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. SCALI



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SECRET 009

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12769 152008Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-71 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
USTE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 ONDE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
ACDA-19 ID-14 MC-02 DRC-01 /136 W

109660

0 1520027 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3030

SECRET MOSCOW 12769

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, XX
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: STATE 203889; STATE 203684

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCRETION PROVIDED IN PARA 10 OF
REF B, I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO APPROACH
FOREIGN MINISTRY TO EXPLAIN OUR RESUPPLY EFFORTS AND TO
ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN SOVIET VIEWS REGARDING EXPECTATIONS FOR
DAYS AHEAD.

2. CONSEQUENTLY, I ASKED THIS AFTERNOON FOR APPOINTMENT
WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV ON OCTOBER 16
AND WILL KEEP APPOINTMENT, IF ARRANGED, UNLESS
INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE.
DURS

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Department of State
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7/4/73

TELEGRAM

Z 151725Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6822
INFO RUEHC/COMUSFORAZ FLASH
BT
SECRET LISBON 3824

CONTROL: 3982Q
RECD: OCT 15, 1973
1812Z

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EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR
SUBJ: LAJES FLIGHTS

REF: LISBON 3793

1. LOCAL AP CORRESPONDENT HAS INQUIRED OF USIS IF GOP HAS VETO OVER FLIGHTS THROUGH LAJES. USIS HAS RESPONDED THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW, THAT THIS INVOLVED INTERPRETATION OF AN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, AND THAT THEREFORE ANY RESPONSE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM STATE DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON.
2. ACCORDING TO OUR CAREFUL RE-READING OF BASIC 1951 AGREEMENT (TIAS 3087) ARTICLE 6 PERMITS THE TRANSIT OF AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT THROUGH LAJES "DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PREPARATION OF THE BASES", WHICH IS THE PERIOD WE TECHNICALLY ARE STILL IN, THAT PREPARATORY PERIOD BEING THE PERIOD EXTENDED BY ALL SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS. WE CAN FIND NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH LIMITS THOSE TRANSIT RIGHTS OR GIVES GOP VETO THERETO.
3. INEVITABLY, QUESTION WILL BE ASKED AS TO WHETHER GOP APPROVED TRANSIT THROUGH LAJES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FLIGHTS, TO ISRAEL. CLEARLY, IT WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOP IF THAT COULD BE ANSWERED BY STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS QUESTION DOES NOT ARISE SINCE, UNDER OUR LONG-STANDING AGREEMENT FOR USE OF THE FACILITIES AT LAJES, NO RESTRICTION IS PLACED ON THE TRANSIT OF US MILITARY AIRCRAFT.
4. FOREIGN OFFICE ACTION OFFICER (FREITAS CRUZ) HAS BEEN ADVISED OF AP QUESTION AND OUR INITIAL RESPONSE. HE IS ALSO STUDYING TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPONSE TO QUERIES ALONG PARA 3 LINES IN MIND. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST IF US AGREES TO HAVE GOP MAKE SUCH A RESPONSE.

POST

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SECRET 871

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 OODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-13 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

ACDA-19 IO-15 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 MC-02 /172 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON, JR.: HLK

10/14/73 EXT 29464

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

NEA: MR. SISCO - WH: GEN. SCOWCROFT

S: AMB MCCLOSKEY - IO: AMB POPPER

S/S: MR. PICKERING - S/S: MR. SARROS

102217

O 150042Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NOUAKHOTT IMMEDIATE

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 203685

INFORM CONSULS

F.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: XX, PFOR

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES FROM THE SECRETARY

1. THIS MESSAGE IS TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR POLICY
EFFORTS AND STRATEGY IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND
ON REASONS FOR OUR DECISION TO MOUNT MILITARY RESUPPLY
OPERATION TO ISRAEL. AT SUCH TIME AS HOST GOVERNMENT
BECOMES AWARE OF RESUPPLY OPERATION AND WE CONFIRM FACT
HERE TO PRESS, YOU MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING IN EXPLAINING
OUR POLICY IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES FROM HOST GOVERNMENT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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OFFICIALS.

2. FROM BEGINNING OF WAR OCTOBER 6, ONCE OUR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES HAD FAILED, OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO TWO OBJECTIVES: TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD A FINAL JUST AND LASTING ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE.

3. TO THESE ENDS WE (A) TOOK THE INITIATIVE ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONVENE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, (B) HAVE HELD INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHERS, AND (C) EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING INITIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN SHIPMENT OF FURTHER ARMS TO AREA OF CONFLICT.

4. IN ADDRESSING SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 7, AMBASSADOR SCALI STATED THE PRINCIPLES WE BELIEVE SHOULD GOVERN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE MADE NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHILE FREE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF IDEAS IN SEARCH FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS GOES FORWARD.

5. MILITARY SITUATION IS INCONCLUSIVE, WITH ISRAELI SALIENT INTO SYRIA 20 MILES FROM DAMASCUS AND EGYPTIAN BRIDGEHEAD UP TO 10 MILES EAST AT SUEZ CANAL. BOTH SIDES HAVE SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT.

6. IN PAST THREE DAYS, I HAVE MADE MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT END TO HOSTILITIES ON BASIS OF PRESENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES. SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FAILURE THESE EFFORTS TO DATE IS THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT COOPERATED AS MUCH AS WE WOULD HAVE DESIRED IN EFFORT TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES.

7. IN ADDITION, SOVIETS TOOK INITIATIVE IN LAUNCHING MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF ARMS, AND NUMBER OF FLIGHTS HAS NOW REACHED 200. AFTER REPEATED REQUESTS TO THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION, THE USG CONCLUDED IT HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN RESUPPLY AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS BEGAN ONLY AFTER SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT HAD REACHED

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. IF EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IS ESTABLISHED, WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP OUR AIRLIFT PROVIDED SOVIETS DO THE SAME.

8. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR MUST BE ENDED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TO THAT END. WE VIEW THIS RESUPPLY EFFORT AS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO REMAIN IN POSITION TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT. I HAD ALREADY INITIATED EFFORTS TO THAT END DURING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA IN NEW YORK WHEN CURRENT HOSTILITIES ERUPTED.

9. FINALLY, WE WANT TO MAKE CATEGORICALLY CLEAR, IN LIGHT OF NUMBER OF IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF U.S. FORCES IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES, THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL IN THIS FIGHTING. KISSINGER

SECRET
6

HAK, Scowcroft 12

FBIS 179*****

// KOSYGIN COMMENTS ON MIDEAST SITUATION //

L151940 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1934 GMT 15 OCT 73 L

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 15 TASS--ALEKSEY KOSYGIN SAID: "WE SHALL
CONTINUE STRENGTHENING FURTHER SOLIDARITY WITH THE ARAB PEOPLES
IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE".

SPEAKING HERE TODAY AT A DINNER IN HONOUR OF PRIME MINISTER
OF DENMARK ANKER JORGENSEN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS SAID:

WE CANNOT BUT SEE THAT THE OPPONENTS OF DETENTE
ARE TRYING TO USE EVERY PRETEXT TO REVIVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF
THE COLD WAR AND CAUSE MISTRUST IN THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE. THEY ARE NOW TRYING IN EVERY WAY TO EXPLOIT IN
THESE PURPOSES THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, WHITEWASHING THE AGGRESSOR AND ACCUSING THE VICTIMS
OF AGGRESSION. THEY HAVE GONE SO FAR IN THIS THAT THEY ARE
PRESENTING THE SOVIET UNION'S SOLIDARITY WITH THE VICTIMS
OF ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION--WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES--AS ALL
BUT THE SOURCE OF TENSION IN THAT AREA. IT IS DIFFICULT
TO IMAGINE ANYTHING FURTHER REMOVED FROM REALITY.

IT IS AN OPEN SECRET THAT THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE
ISRAELI RULING CIRCLES IS A CAUSE OF THE EXISTING SITUATION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST. USING OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND PATRONAGE, THESE
CIRCLES WERE FRUSTRATING ALL THE EFFORTS AIMED AT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WERE
FANNING UP THE FLAMES OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

AS TO THE SOVIET UNION, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE LEONID BREZHNEV STRESSED RECENTLY THAT OUR COUNTRY WAS
AND REMAINS A FIRM SUPPORTER OF A JUST DURABLE PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND OF GUARANTEED SECURITY FOR ALL THE
COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES OF THE AREA. AS BEFORE, WE ARE READY TO MAKE
OUR CONTRIBUTION TO ENSURING SUCH A PEACE.

SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND OTHER
ARAB COUNTRIES, UPHOLDING THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ISRAELI AGGRESSOR AND
THE CARE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST PEACE--THIS IS THE
ESSENCE OF OUR POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SEEK ANYTHING FOR ITSELF IN THE
AREA. ALL OUR ACTIONS ARE AIMED AT HELPING THE PEOPLES OF THE
ARAB COUNTRIES LIBERATE THEIR LANDS SEIZED BY ISRAEL, ACHIEVE
A JUST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, STRENGTHEN THEIR INDEPENDENCE,
CREATE A FLOURISHING NATIONAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOP ALONG THE
ROAD OF PROGRESS.

15 OCT 2009Z DPS/HH*****

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM
WH

SECRET 123

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PAGE 01 JIDDA 04516 151028Z

11

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

104108

0 151000Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5196

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NI E IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE

47358/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI NIACT IMMEDIATE 0583

USMISSION USUN NY NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECRET JIDDA 4516

EXDIS

DEPT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, US

SUBJ: U.S. RESPONSE TO SAUDI RETALIATION

SUMMARY: IF SAUDIS RETALIATE AGAINST U.S. OIL INTERESTS IN RESPONSE TO OUR AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL, WE SHOULD NOT RESPOND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO KEEP UNHELPFUL DIALOGUE GOING ANOTHER ROUND. END SUMMARY

1. WILL PRESENT SECRETARY'S LETTER ON U.S. AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL TO PRINCE NAWWAF AND DR. PHARAON SOMETIME MORNING OF MIDOBER 15. WHEN DIWAN LEARNED OF LETTER THEY ASKED TO WHOM DID I WISH TO PRESENT IT; I REPLIED PRINCE NAWWAF. I THINK CHANCES OF A SOFT LANDING BETTER FOR SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (#) PHARAON HEAR IT (#) AND HAVE CHANCE

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ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGRODONT _____
RATLIFT _____
W. PRON _____
W. PRON _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

D/B



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 04516 151028Z

TO REFLECT ON IT. THEY WILL BE UNHAPPY WITH NEWS,
BUT THAT AS MUCH AS KING, AND IT MAY BE JUST AS WELL
USE NOT FORCE TO REGISTER WHAT MAY BE INITIAL
EMOTIONAL REACTION.

2. BELIEVE IT MORE THAN LIKELY THAT SAG WILL FEEL--
ON BASIS OF PREVIOUS URGINGS AND A MORE AROUSED ARAB
PUBLIC OPINION--TO TAKE SOME RETALIATORY ACTION. THIS
COULD BE EITHER AT LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION,
OUR EXTENSIVE MILITARY/SECURITY PROGRAMS, OR OIL. WE
THINK SAUDIS WILL COME DOWN WITH SOME GESTURE IN OIL
DEPARTMENT. (KUWAIT OIL MEETING COMES AT BAD TIME.)
OF THREE CHOICES, OIL IS THE ONE MOST CONSONANT WITH
NATURE OF ARAB CRIES FOR ACTION, AND WOULD HAVE
LEAST IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON U.S. TIES AND INTERNAL
SECURITY SITUATION. SAUDI REACTION MAY TAKE FORM
OF ANNOUNCEMENT IMPOSITION OF CUTBACK OR CEILING
ON PRODUCTION. IF THIS HAPPENS, STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT
WE SHOULD PLAY IT COOL. WE SHOULD NOT--BY SOUNDING
OUTRAGED OR AGGRIEVED--KEEP AN UNHELPFUL DIALOGUE
GOING IN ANOTHER EXCHANGE.
HORAN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED BAGHDAD
JIDDA 4516 (#) OMISSION CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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THE WALL

5

11
ACTION SS-30

19327A

0 150742Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JTDG
TO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5193

FXDIS

7 AGS: PFDR, SA

SUBJ: SECURITY SITUATION AND SAG RESPONSE TO U.S. INITIATIVE^{ALSH}

1. SAG IS BEING INFORMED BY LETTER FROM SECSTATE THIS MORNING OF FAILURE OUR EFFORTS BRING AN END TO HSUTILITIES ON THE BASIS OF PRESENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES AND SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THIS FAILURE IS MASSIVE SOVIET AIRLIFT OF ARMS. WE ARE TO BEGIN OUR OWN AIRLIFT, SAG BEING REASSURED THAT THIS IS NOT INTENDED AS ANTI-ARAB AND WE WISH REMAIN IN POSITION TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WE PREPARED STOP AIRLIFT AS SOON AS CEASEFIRE ACHIEVED PROVIDE SOVIETS DO THE SAME.

2. CHARGE HORAN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE AND DOES NOT EXPECT IMPACT OF OUR DECISION ON SECURITY SITUATION WILL BE DRASTIC. CHARRAN SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE EXTRA PRECAUTIONS IN IMMEDIATE COORDINATION WITH CHIEF USNM OR HIS DEPUTY IF HE HAS ALREADY LEFT.
HORAN

DODGE 0000
~~ANDERSON~~
 HO DRIDGE
 NORMATS
 JORDEN
~~W. WARD~~
 LEHMAN
 PLANE
 M. GROPONTE
 JOSEN
~~WATLIFE~~
 RONDON
~~SANDERS~~
 M. NINENFELDT
 W. L. G.

D/E

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

HAK, Lowry - LL

*Quandt was
More on Soviet effort
regarding support for Arabs*

FBI 170 (SEE 125)

TASS REPORTS ALGERIAN PRESIDENT'S VISIT

L151331 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1757 GMT 15 OCT 73 L

" (TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 15 TASS--THE USSR AND ALGERIA HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR RESOLVE TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY THE LIBERATION OF ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. "

THE CHAIRMAN OF ALGERIA'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HOARI BOUMEDIENE STAYED IN THE SOVIET UNION ON A FRIENDLY VISIT ON OCTOBER 14-15.

HE HAD TALKS WITH SOVIET LEADERS LEONID BREZHNEV, NIKOLAY PODGORNYY AND ALEKSEY KOSYGIN.

"IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TOOK PLACE ON THE NEW AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAUSED BY ISRAEL'S IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION AND ALSO ON OTHER TOPICAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE PRESENT-DAY SITUATION IN THE WORLD IN GENERAL," IT IS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED. "THE SIDES CONFIRMED THEIR RESOLVE TO GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE TO THE LIBERATION OF ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL."

ALSO DISCUSSED WERE QUESTIONS OF FURTHER DEVELOPING AND STRENGTHENING FRIENDSHIP AND ALL-ROUND COOPERATION BETWEEN ALGERIA AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THE TALKS PASSED IN A FRIENDLY, FRANK ATMOSPHERE.

15 OCT 1358Z MJO/MC

89

MOSCOW--ADD SOVIET-MIDEAST (84)

THE KREMLIN'S STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB SIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAR CAME IN A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED HERE FOLLOWING SECRET TALKS BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER LEONID I. BREZHNEV AND ALGERIAN PRESIDENT HOUARI BOUMEDIENNE.

"DURING THE TALKS THERE WAS A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE NEW AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAUSED BY ISRAEL'S IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION," THE GOVERNMENT NEWS AGENCY SAID.

BOUMEDIENNE AND HIS HOSTS, INCLUDING SOVIET DEFENSE CHIEF MARSHAL ANDREI GRECHKO, "CONFIRMED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY THE LIBERATION OF ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL," TASS SAID.

SR250PED OCT 15

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DOD (LDX)
CIA (LDX)
NSA (LDX)
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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #31

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, 10/15/73

Military Situation

An IDF statement reports that the night of October 14 passed quietly on both the Golan and the Sinai fronts. Press reports, however, state the Egyptian offensive in the Sinai was resumed on October 15. The Israelis report fedayeen rocket attacks on two Galilee settlements and claim to have killed six fedayeen infiltrators. Israeli settlements in the Hula Valley were also shelled by Syrian artillery.

Israeli naval units raided an Egyptian naval base at Ras Gharib in the Gulf of Suez during the night, apparently with some success.

According to Embassy Amman, Saudi units have entered Syria and are headed toward Kisswa, near Damascus. Jordanian troops in Syria have still not engaged the Israelis. Kuwait has reportedly dispatched an artillery force to take part in the Syrian fighting.

The Israelis report downing 19 Arab planes on October 14, four of them over Syria.

Saudi Reponse to President's Letter

Prince Nawwaf expressed pleasure at the constructive tone of the President's reply to King Faisal's message of October 11. Nawwaf noted, however, that the King would have been even more pleased if the letter had provided specific assurances that the US would not support Israel militarily and had detailed a US plan for early resolution of the conflict along the lines of Security

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS - DECLAS Dec. 21, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

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
Council Resolution 242.

US Resupply of Israel

The fact that the US is resupplying Israel with military equipment is now in the public domain. There are reports from Portugal of stepped-up air activity ✓ at a US base in the Azores.

American Communities

There are still no specific indications that American communities in the Middle East are threatened. This situation could change dramatically as the specifics of the American resupply effort to Israel become known in the Arab world.



SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

October 15, 1973

Wag

SECRET/NODIS

To: The Secretary

From: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

NSC Meeting on the Middle East --
October 15, 1973, 4:30 p.m.

for NSC
book

The primary purpose of this meeting is to review the current military and diplomatic situation in the Middle East and to discuss the broad alternatives open to us. No decisions need to be made at this meeting. It will be useful for the NSC principals to hear the President describe our broad objectives in the current crisis.

Key Issues

The key issue over the next few days is whether, as our military airlift to Israel continues:

-- we stand fast for now on our present diplomatic posture, or

-- we launch an early diplomatic initiative to get the fighting stopped and a negotiating process started.

The nature and timing of a decision on this issue will depend in large measure on the evolution of the military situation on the ground, which is an important determinant of Israel's and our negotiating strength. At the same time, we must be aware that as time passes without a ceasefire, the risks to our interests in the Arab world will grow and the costs to the parties directly involved will also increase.

If we decide on a diplomatic initiative, the issue will be posed by the protagonists and their supporters in terms of (a) a ceasefire in place, (b) a ceasefire along the October 6 ceasefire lines, or (c) a ceasefire with Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines. Beyond the issue of the ceasefire line, there is the key question of how

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any ceasefire will be related to future negotiating efforts.

A related issue which we will face in any case -- though its extent and timing will depend on the course of the war and how long our resupply airlift to Israel goes on -- is what we can do to protect U.S. interests against Arab punitive actions. We will also need to watch the situation closely to determine whether we need to begin evacuating Americans from Arab countries. Finally, some mention should be made of our efforts to prepare for the contingency of an Arab oil cutoff or slowdown.

Drafted: NEA:ALAtherton, Jr./NSC:WQuandt:lab
Ext. 29380:10/15/73

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SECRET/NODIS

TALKING POINTS

NSC Meeting
October 15, 4:30 p.m.

1. Let me briefly review the record of our diplomatic efforts. In the few hours' warning we had before the Egyptian/Syrian attack across the ceasefire lines, I tried with the Soviets, the Egyptians, Hussein, Faisal, the SYG, and others to forestall hostilities. Since hostilities broke out on October 6, I have held virtually round-the-clock diplomatic consultations -- with the Israelis, the Soviets, various Arabs and other Security Council members -- with the objective of stopping hostilities in such a way that a new ceasefire might lay the basis for renewed diplomatic efforts for a final Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

2. Initially, we considered that the best basis would be to get the fighting stopped with both sides returning to the ceasefire lines. This objective was based on the assumption, which was also the Israeli assumption, of a quick Israeli military victory -- an assumption which has proven incorrect. The Soviets and Arabs initially favored a ceasefire in-place to protect the Egyptian and Syrian bridgeheads across the ceasefire lines.

3. When it became apparent that Israel was having tough going militarily, we sounded out the Israelis on the idea of a ceasefire in-place. They agreed, but by then President Sadat -- and therefore the Soviets -- were no longer interested.

4. No consensus has emerged in the Security Council, while everyone waits to see how the military situation develops. We have made no specific proposals for Security Council action, knowing that they would be countered by a proposal for a ceasefire coupled with a call for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines, which we would have to veto. This is where the diplomatic situation stands today.

5. Meanwhile, the military situation remains inconclusive. Our intelligence estimates are that the Israelis ought to be able to stabilize the situation

SECRET/NODIS

roughly along present lines in Syria and in Western Sinai. In response to a massive Soviet resupply effort, we began over the weekend a large-scale airlift to Israel.

6. In deciding what course we should follow, the battlefield situation is a major factor. If the Israelis are having difficulties militarily, and our military resupply airlift to Israel has to continue on a large scale, I expect that Arab criticism and perhaps action directed against our interests will begin to rise. At the same time, the Arabs will feel themselves in a strong negotiating position in looking at possible diplomatic proposals. If the Israelis begin soon to stabilize the military situation, the prospects for an Egyptian acceptance of a ceasefire should increase. But to the extent the Israelis begin to succeed in circumstances where our airlift is continuing, Arab moves against our interests are likely to be accelerated.

7. The timing of any political initiative is, therefore, crucial in terms both of our position in the Arab world and our negotiating stance with respect to the Soviets, who can be expected to continue to support strongly the Arab war effort and political position.

8. The central issue now is whether we stand fast on our present diplomatic position or make an early move on the diplomatic front. In deciding this issue, we need to balance the advantages of waiting to see whether the Israelis improve their military position against the risks to our interests in the Arab world as the fighting continues while we are providing Israel large-scale military resupply.

9. We face two broad choices. We can maintain our present diplomatic position for a ceasefire in-place and take the chance that the present inconclusive military situation will begin in the next day or two to be resolved in Israel's favor. Meanwhile, we can adopt a generally tough posture toward the Soviets and toward any Arab threats to take punitive action against us. Or, we can move in the next day or two to launch a political initiative looking toward a ceasefire in-place linked with negotiations for a final settlement. If we take this course, we could move first in the UN context or bilaterally in diplomatic channels.

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10. Beyond these diplomatic considerations, we have taken measures to prepare for a possible Arab oil boycott. Two task forces are working on this problem, one on the domestic angle under Governor Love and one on the international implications.

11. In addition, we are alert to the possible danger to American citizens in the area and have evacuation plans ready if the situation requires their use.

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SECRET

WH War
COPY 8 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4 0 6 2Q
RECD: 15 OCT, 5:30PM

0152010Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1369
BT
SECRET ANKARA 8194

NODIS

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MARR, GP, IT, GR, TU
SUBJECT: RESUPPLY LIFT TO ISRAEL - EMERGENCY LANDINGS

REF A. ANKARA 8146, B. ANKARA 8192, C. STATE 203818

1. AS REFS A AND B HAVE BEEN SENT NODIS, I AM CONCERNED THAT DRAFTERS OF REF C MAY NOT BE FULLY FAMILIAR WITH TURK CONCERN AND US ASSURANCES REGARDING NON-USE OF INCIRLIK IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT MID-EAST SITUATION.
2. CONCUR THAT FORCE MAJEUR A LEGITIMATE REASON FOR EMERGENCY LANDING OF AIRCRAFT AS OUTLINED REF C AND THAT PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS WITH GOT NOT NECESSARY. WE WILL, OF COURSE, DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO BE HELPFUL IF SUCH SITUATION ARISES.
3. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, TURK OFFICIALS NOW CLOSELY MONITORING ALL US ACTIVITIES AT INCIRLIK, AND I CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT A PLANE WHICH TURKS BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN ISRAEL RESUPPLY OPERATION WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE ONCE IT HAD LANDED THERE.
- HOWEVER, IF PALNE HAS DELIVERED LOAD AND EN ROUTE BACK TO BASE, I BELIEVE EMERGENCY LANDING AND THEN ONWARD FLIGHT TO BASE NOT A VIOLATION OF SPIRIT OF USG ASSURANCES TO GOT, PROVIDED THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN FREQUENTLY. ON OTHER HAND, IF PLANE HAS NOT YET DELIVERED CARGO AND WISHES TO TAKE OFF AGAIN FROM INCIRLIK ON ONWARD FLIGHT TO ISRAEL, I BELIEVE THIS WOULD CLEARLY BE REGARDED AS VIOLATION OF BOTH LETTER AND SPIRIT OF US ASSURANCES.
4. IF DEPARTMENT CONCRUS FOREGOING, SUGGEST THAT USAF AUTHORITIES INVOLVED IN RESUPPLY EXERCISE BE CAUTIONED THAT AIRCRAFT SHOULD AVOID INCIRLIK IF POSSIBLE AND, IF NOT, THAT THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED RETURN POINT OF ORIGIN OR SOME OTHER BASE RATHER THAN PROCEEDING TO ISRAEL ONCE PLANE IS READY TO GO AGAIN.

MACOMBER

SECRET

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Department of State

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10/15
TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY

Z 151042Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5197
BT
SECRET JIDDA 4517

CONTROL: 3654Q
RECVD: 15 OCT 73
7:18AM

NODIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA, ME
SUBJECT: SAG INITIAL REACTION TO SECRETARY'S LETTER

1. 1145 LOCAL OCTOBER 15 CHARGE ACCOMPANIED BY
POL OFFICER DEFORD PRESENTED TO PRINCE NAWWAF
SECRETARY'S LETTER TO KING. CHARGE READ TO PRINCE
ARABIC TRANSLATION; PRINCE LISTENED WITHOUT COMMENT,
AND STATED THAT HE WOULD SEE THAT ANY REPLY WOULD
BE PRESENTED TO MR. DEFORD (WHO IS REMAINING IN
RIYADH FOR TIME BEING). PRINCE ASKED FOR AND WAS
GIVEN CHARGE'S HANDWRITTEN ARABIC TRANSLATION;
ENTIRE MEETING TOOK NO MORE THAN TEN MINUTES.

2. AFTERWARDS IN DISCUSSION WITH CHIEF OF ROYAL
DIWAN, SAYYID AHMED ABDUL WAHHAB, SAYYID AHMED
EXPRESSED REGRET OVER DECISION AND URGED THAT
NEWS OF OUR POLICY DECISION BE HANDLED IN AS LOW-
KEY A WAY AS POSSIBLE. HE INDICATED THAT PROMINENCE
WE GAVE TO OUR POLICY SHIFT WOULD ITSELF HELP TO
DETERMINE INTENSITY OF ARAB REACTION. HE HOPED
WE COULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT VOLUME OF SHIPMENTS
BEING HELD TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO BALANCE
SOVIET RESUPPLY.

3. UNDERSTAND SADAT'S ADVISOR ASHRAF MARWAN WAS
IN PALACE MEETING WITH KING AT SAME TIME; PRINCE
NAWWAF MAY HAVE TAKEN SECRETARY'S LETTER DIRECTLY
TO ROYAL AUDIENCE CHAMBER.

4. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH REPEAT THIS INITIAL
SAG REACTION TO OTHER POSTS.

HORAN

BT
#4517

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 3930Q
RECD: OCT 15, 1973
1524Z

Q 151445Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4023
BT
SECRET CAIRO 3120

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR US UR EG IS
SUBJECT: SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR US INTERVENTION TO
ACHIEVE CEASEFIRE AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

REF: CAIRO 3052

1. DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR YEDRASHNIKOV TELEPHONED USINTOFF (HOUGHTON) OCTOBER 15 TO SAY IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THEY MEET BRIEFLY. APPOINTMENT WAS ARRANGED. USINTOFF APOLOGIZED FOR NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO SEE YEDRASHNIKOV ON OCTOBER 12, BUT NOTED THAT PRESS OF WORK AND ABSENCE OF ANY USEFUL IDEAS ON SUBJECT OF ME SETTLEMENT SEEMED TO OBVIATE MEETING AT THAT TIME.

2. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE DID WANT TO MAKE A FEW SUGGESTIONS, HOWEVER, ON A PERSONAL BASIS AND EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS REASON FOR PRESENT MEETING. HE NOTED PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION. SYRIA SEEMED TO BE IN MUCH BETTER CONDITION THAN IT WAS FOUR DAYS AGO. EGYPT WAS HOLDING, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SHE WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT IMPROVEMENT IN SYRIAN SITUATION HAD CONTRIBUTED TO EGYPTIAN ABILITY TO WITHSTAND EXPECTED ISRAELI ONSLAUGHT.

3. OUTCOME OF SITUATION WAS STILL INDETERMINATE. THE WAY HE SAW IT, EGYPTIANS WERE PLANNING ON MAINTAINING ESSENTIALLY STATIC POSTURE WHILE ISRAELIS FLUNG THEMSELVES USELESSLY AGAINST EGYPTIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES. EGYPTIANS EXPECTED THAT WHEN ISRAEL WAS SUITABLY WEAKENED, SHE WOULD PLEAD FOR A CEASEFIRE, WHICH EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF ISRAELI RETURN TO PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES. EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING LESS. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT IF ISRAELIS WOULD NOT ACCEPT CEASEFIRE ON THESE TERMS, EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE ACROSS SINAI UNTIL THEY ATTAINED THIS END FOR THEMSELVES.

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W War (6)

Sov

Soviet TASS agent in Cairo on cease fire



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2-CAIRO 3120, OCT 15


4. YEDRASHNIKOV SAW THIS AS A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. ISRAELIS NEEDED TO BE ASSURED THAT ARAB FORCES WOULD NOT ENTER ISRAEL PROPER. HE SAID THAT SOME GREAT POWER INPUT WAS NEEDED-A PROPOSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A CEASEFIRE COUPLED WITH SOME FACE-SAVING FORMULA WHICH WOULD PERMIT SITUATION TO STABILIZE. SOVIET UNION COULD DO LITTLE: IT HAD VIRTUALLY NO INFLUENCE AMONG ARABS. US ON THE OTHER HAND HAD POWERFUL INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL. ✓

5. YEDRASHNIKOV THEN SUGGESTED THAT US SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE. BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE FOR US PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-JUNE-1967 BOONDARIES. CEASEFIRE, ACCOMPANIES BY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, COULD BE ENFORCED BY GREAT POWER PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OR SOME OTHER MECHANISM. IMPORTANT POINT WAS A CEASEFIRE TOWARD WHICH THE US WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO ASSIST.]

6. WITHOUT REPLYING SUBSTANTIVELY, USINTOFF THANKED YEDRASHNIKOV FOR HIS VIEW, AND MEETING ENDED.

SMITH

BT
#3120



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Wa

SECRET 984

PAGE 01 ROME 11194 151933Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

NSAE-00 CIAE-00 /031 W

0151840Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1336
INFO USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET ROME 11194

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS IS IT
SUBJECT: SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL

1. ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS ON OCTOBER 15, RAISED WITH MAAG POSSIBILITY OF PURCHASING NUMEROUS ARTICLES OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM U.S. SOURCES WITHIN ITALY. ISRAELI SHOPPING LIST INVOLVED 175 MM AMMO - 10,000 ROUNDS; 155 MM AMMO - 10,000 ROUNDS; 105 MM ANTI-TANK AMMO - 10,000 ROUNDS; 20 MM PERLIKEN AMMO - 100,000 ROUNDS. HEAVY CLOTHING - ANY QUANTITY AVAILABLE. TOW MISSILE SIMULATORS - 2; ANTI TANK MINES - UNSPECIFIED BUT ANY TYPE. ISRAELI OFFICIALS CHARACTERIZED REQUEST AS DUPLICATING THOSE MADE ELSEWHERE INCLUDING IN U.S., BUT SAID ISRAELIS WERE INTERESTED IN SECURING FASTEST TRANS- SHIPMENT POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION TO U.S. MILITARY STOCKS, ISRAELIS SUGGESTED PROVIDING REQUESTED EQUIPMENT FROM MAP SUPPLIES BORROWED BACK FROM ITALIANS.

2. ON THE MODE OF TRANSPORT FOR THE HARDWARE ISRAELIS SAID THEY WOULD PICK UP EQUIPMENT FROM ANY LOCATION DESIGNATED BY US. THEY ASKED IF AN AIRBASE USED BY US FORCES, E.G. AVIANO OR SIGONELLA, MIGHT BE UTILIZED FOR QUICK COVERT NIGHT TIME PICKUP, USING ISRAELI C-130 TYPE AIRCRAFT. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT THEY "WOULD HANDLE" TRANSACTION WITH "ITALIAN NON-CIVILIAN

ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HOLDRIDGE
J. J.
K. J.
L. J.
M. J.
N. J.
O. J.
P. J.
Q. J.
R. J.
S. J.
T. J.
U. J.
V. J.
W. J.
X. J.
Y. J.
Z. J.

109349

1713

Israelis asked
US for equipment
but also busy
checking
directly
with our
embassies

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ROME 11194 151933Z

AUTHORITIES", BUT, ADMITTED THIS DID NOT MEAN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. THEY DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON TO WHOM THEY WERE REFERRING, BUT PROMISED TO SEEK AUTHORIZATION TO INFORM MAAG. THEY WOULD PLAN TO TRANSHIP CLOTHING ROUTINELY ON COMMERCIAL EL AL FLIGHTS. IN CONCLUSION, ISRAELIS SAID THEY WOULD NOT PRESS FOR SALE IF IT WOULD CAUSE COMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. - ITALIAN GOVERNMENT RELATIONS.

3. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH ITALIANS ON SALE OF BLANKETS TO ISRAEL, WE DO NOT HOLD OUT MUCH HOPE FOR SECURING ITALIAN APPROVAL, ESPECIALLY FOR HARDWARE PORTION OF REQUEST. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE CLANDESTINE SUGGESTION USING ITALIAN FACILITIES WITHOUT GOI APPROVAL BE PURSUED. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT BUT THAT IT WOULD BECOME PUBLIC AND THE GOI WOULD FIND OUR PROCEEDING WITHOUT THEIR CONCURRENCE UNCONSCIONABLE. SO WE ARE LEFT WITH EITHER ASKING FOR A GOI GO-AHEAD (WITH MINIMUM CHANCE OF SUCCESS) OR INFORMING THE LOCAL ISRAELIS THAT PURSUING THE MATTER WOULD INDEED COMPLICATE US-ITALIAN RELATIONS. AS TO THE CHOICE BETWEEN THESE TWO ALTERNATIVES, MUCH, WE SUSPECT, DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS ARE AND WILL BE SATISFIED FROM OTHER U.S. SOURCES. REGARDING THE PARTICULARS OF THE ISRAELI SHOPPING LIST, WE HAVE NO CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT IS AVAILABLE IN U.S. STOCKS IN ITALY -- PERHAPS DOD OR ENCOM CAN PROVIDE A QUICK FIX ON THIS. MEANWHILE, WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH ANY ITALIANS, THE MAAG IS REVIEWING MAP INVENTORY STOCKS.

4. PLEASE ADVISE AS TO WASHINGTON THINKING ON THIS LATEST ISRAELI REQUEST.

5. AFTER ABOVE WAS DRAFTED, ISRAELIS CALLED MAAG BACK TO ELABORATE ON CLOTHING REQUEST. THEY DESIRE THIRTY TO FORTY THOUSAND SETS OF WOOL STOCKINGS, WOOLEN UNDERWEAR, WOOLEN SWEATERS AND WOOLEN FIELD JACKETS. VOLPE

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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 32

Situation Report in the Middle East as of (1200) EDT, Oct. 15, 1973

Military Situation

An IDF statement reports that in the early morning of October 15 both fronts were relatively quiet. The Israelis state that an Egyptian attack in the northern part of the Sinai line during the morning was thrown back by an Israeli counterattack. As of 2200 hours October 14, Egyptian sources claimed that the front line is 20 to 23 kilometers east of the Canal, but the Israelis state that the Egyptians are nowhere more than 10 kilometers east. An Egyptian source claimed that the Egyptian offensive on October 14 was intended to relieve pressure on the Syrians but had the secondary purpose of advancing toward the three principal passes in the Sinai. The Egyptians claim that they captured two forward Israeli airstrips but lost 76 tanks. Israeli military sources state that the Israelis knocked out some 280 Egyptian tanks on October 14.

Israeli spokesmen state that the Israeli Air Force is the "absolute initiator" of air operations on both fronts, and on October 15 attacked Egyptian airfields as well as enemy missile batteries and armor in the canal area. The Israelis also announced that they had bombed fuel depots on the Syrian coast and downed 5 Syrian and 3 Egyptian planes. An Egyptian source stated that Egyptian-piloted Mirages sent from Libya now total 36 and have been in action over Sinai. The press quotes the Egyptians as announcing they have shot down 9 Israeli planes on October 15.

According to Embassy Amman, the Jordanian brigade in Syria has not yet had any direct contact with the Israelis, and the deliberate staged movement of a Saudi unit of 1,000 to 1,500 men to the Damascus area suggests that the Jordanians and Saudi troop movements are primarily political in purpose.

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS - DECLASS Dec. 21, 1981

War

SECRET/EXDIS

- 2 -

Oil Situation

In Saudi Arabia oil off-take in the Persian Gulf continues at a normal rate, but ARAMCO officials and our Embassy in Jidda believe King Faisal will feel he will have to take "some" retaliatory action if the U.S. makes an announcement concerning U.S. military resupply of Israel. A press report from Baghdad states that the meeting of OPEC to discuss using oil as an Arab retaliatory weapon has been postponed from Tuesday to Wednesday, October 17.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY:

[Signature]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4164Q
RECD: 16 OCT 73 2AM

O 151814Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 121
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8146

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, IS, US, UR
SUBJECT: T-62 TANK DELIVERY

MY DATT HAS ADVISED ME THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE WILL, THIS EVENING, TURN OVER TO US ONE SOVIET T-62 TANK. IT WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE U.S. IN THE FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORT. DATT IS REPORTING THROUGH HIS SPECIAL CHANNEL. THIS IS JUST TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE WILL BE GETTING THIS TANK, WHICH ENJOYS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY ON U.S. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION LISTS.
KEATING

SECRET


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TELEGRAM

SECRET 946

PAGE 01 STATE 203094

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ORIGIN SS-70

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DRAFTED BY: EUR:WJSTOESSEL, JR.
APPROVED BY: EUR:WJSTOESSEL, JR.
S/S-D: PP SARROS

P 150455Z OCT 73
FM SFCSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 203694

EXDTS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: DYRA (STEIN, HERBERT)
SUBJECT: STEIN VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

1. PLEASE ADVISE DR. STEIN ON HIS ARRIVAL IN BUCHAREST THAT, IN VIEW OF YUGOSLAV ACQUESCENCE IN SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS TO MIDDLE EAST AND PROVISION OF LANDING FACILITIES (SEE SEPTEL REGARDING STOESEL'S COMMUNICATION TO YUGOSLAVIAN AMBASSADOR HERE) WE FEEL IT IS ADVISABLE THAT STEIN CANCEL HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO ROMANIA. HE SHOULD THEREFORE RETURN FROM BUCHAREST WITHOUT TOUCHING DOWN IN BELGRADE.

2. FOR BELGRADE: YOU SHOULD ADVISE YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS THAT DR. STEIN HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND WILL BE UNABLE TO CARRY THROUGH WITH HIS VISIT TO BELGRADE. KISSINGER

Yugo

ANDERSON _____
HARRIS _____
MORRIS _____
JOHNSEN _____
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LEWISAN _____
LAWRENCE _____
PERKOPORTE _____
ARMON _____
LATHAM _____
ROBERTS _____

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V.I.C.
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PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #3693 2880541
P 150455Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5724
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 8052
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 2156
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 8262
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2900

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 203693

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PEGR, HU, YD
SUBJECT: SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND HUNGARY

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESEL CALLED IN YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR GRANFIL AND HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR SZABO IN SUCCESSION ON OCTOBER 14 TO EXPRESS OUR VERY DEEP CONCERN OVER USE BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT OF YUGOSLAV AND HUNGARIAN AIRSPACE AND LANDING FACILITIES IN CARRYING OUT MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO ARAB STATES. STOESEL SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO SAY THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT YUGOSLAV AND HUNGARIAN ACTIONS IN THIS REGARD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SITUATION IS SERIOUS AND WE HOPE THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL EXERCISE A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN DEVELOPMENTS.

2. STOESEL FURTHER TOLD GRANFIL THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM TO SAY THAT THE YUGOSLAV ACTION IS ANOTHER POINT TO BE ADDED TO THE LIST WHICH STOESEL GAVE GRANFIL OCTOBER 9 (STATE 200523), OF POINTS WHICH SHADOW OUR RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA.

3. GRANFIL AND SZABO PROFESSED NO INFORMATION ABOUT OVERFLIGHTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND SAID THEY WOULD REPORT OUR VIEW TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS. KISSINGER
BT

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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0000
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State to area
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S E C R E T STATE 203684

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XX, PER
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES FROM SECRETARY

INFORM CONSULS

*****HIS COMMENT*****

QUANDT

PSN:004289

PAGE 01

TOR:288/2:27Z

DTG:150041Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

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KUWAIT PASS DOHA, OMAN

1. THIS MESSAGE IS TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR POLICY EFFORTS AND STRATEGY IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND ON REASONS FOR OUR DECISION TO MOUNT MILITARY RESUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. AFTER SUCH TIME AS GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED BECOMES AWARE OF OUR AIRLIFT EFFORT AND WE CONFIRM FACT HERE TO PRESS, YOU SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE IN MAKING OUR VIEWS KNOWN WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL.

2. FROM BEGINNING OF WAR OCTOBER 6, ONCE OUR ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES HAD FAILED, OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO TWO OBJECTIVES: TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD A FINAL JUST AND LASTING ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE.

3. TO THESE ENDS WE (A) TOOK THE INITIATIVE ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONVENE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, (B) HAVE HELD INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHERS, AND (C) EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING INITIAL PERIOD OF CRISIS IN SHIPMENT OF FURTHER ARMS TO AREA OF CONFLICT.

4. IN ADDRESSING SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 7, AMBASSADOR SCALI STATED THE PRINCIPLES WE BELIEVE SHOULD GOVERN ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE FORMULATED NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, ADOPTED NO RIGID POSITIONS AND SUBMITTED NO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS, IN ORDER NOT TO PREJUDICE FREE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF IDEAS AS SEARCH FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS GOES FORWARD.

5. FYI: MILITARY SITUATION HAS NOW EVOLVED TO POINT WHERE ISRAELIS HAVE DRIVEN SALIENT INTO SYRIAN LINES (WHICH INCLUDE IRAQI AND SOME MOROCCAN FORCES) TO WITHIN 20 MILES OF DAMASCUS; JORDAN HAS SENT A BRIGADE TO SOUTHERN SYRIAN FRONT WHICH IS NOT, HOWEVER, ENGAGED IN COMBAT; AND EGYPT HAS CONTINUED MASSIVE BUILD-UP EAST OF CANAL WHERE IT HOLDS AREA UP TO 10 MILES INTO SINAI. MEANWHILE, BOTH SIDES HAVE SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT. END FYI.

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6. IN PAST THREE DAYS, I HAVE MADE MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT END TO HOSTILITIES ON BASIS OF PRESENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES. SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FAILURE THESE EFFORTS TO DATE IS THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT COOPERATED AS MUCH AS WE WOULD HAVE DESIRED IN EFFORT TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES.

7. IN ADDITION, SOVIETS TOOK INITIATIVE IN LAUNCHING MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF ARMS, AND NUMBER OF FLIGHTS HAS NOW REACHED 200. AFTER REPEATED REQUESTS TO THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION, THE USG CONCLUDED IT HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN RESUPPLY AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS BEGAN ONLY AFTER SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT HAD REACHED MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. WE WISH TO STATE THAT AS SOON AS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP OUR AIRLIFT PROVIDED THE SOVIETS DO THE SAME.

8. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR MUST BE ENDED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TO THAT END. WE VIEW THIS RESUPPLY EFFORT AS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO REMAIN IN POSITION TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT. I HAD ALREADY INITIATED EFFORTS TO THAT END DURING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA IN NEW YORK WHEN CURRENT HOSTILITIES ERUPTED.

9. FINALLY, WE WANT TO MAKE CATEGORICALLY CLEAR, IN LIGHT OF NUMBER OF IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF U.S. FORCES IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL IN THE FIGHTING.

10. FOR MOSCOW: YOU MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING IN YOUR DISCRETION AND AS YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE IN DEALING WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS.

11. FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES AT ARAB POSTS: IT IS ESSENTIAL EACH OF YOU PLAY THIS MATTER CALM AND COOL. WE ARE PURSUING THE ONLY COURSE FEASIBLE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. I REALIZE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME CRITICISM, BUT THIS CABLE SUPPLIES YOU WITH AMPLE AMMUNITION IN YOUR TALKS. ONE THING I WANT ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERSTAND -- WE ARE PLAYING AND INTEND TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. WE WANT TO BRING ABOUT AN END OF THE WAR THAT OFFERS SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIPLOMACY IN WHICH WE WILL TAKE SERIOUS ACCOUNT OF ARAB CONCERNS. THE ARABS, THEREFORE, SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT

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THEY CANNOT BULLY AND VILIFY THE U.S. ON THE ONE HAND
AND TELL US ON THE OTHER HAND WE ARE KEY AND EXPECT US
TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE AFTERMATH.
KISSINGER
BT

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DE KULSAC #8115 2881250
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UNCLAS TEL AVIV 8115

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED
E U 11652: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT: DAYAN DESCRIBES ISRAEL'S WAR

LSR

1. SUMMARY: STRIKING ELEMENT IN DAYAN'S REMARKS IN HIS OCT 14 TELEVISION INTERVIEW IN HEBREW IS HIS PREDICTION THAT WAR WILL NOT END WITH AN AGREED CEASEFIRE BUT THROUGH ARAB EXHAUSTION AND CONSEQUENT ARAB CESSATION OF FIRING. PICTURE HE PAINTED OF WAR'S TERMINATION HAS ISRAEL DELIVERING DECISIVE, MASSIVE BLOW TO ENEMY FORCES-- BUT ALSO INCLUDES POSSIBILITY OF FAR HEAVIER MOBILIZATION THAN NOW EXISTS BOTH INSIDE ISRAEL AND OF HELP FROM WORLD JEWRY, IMPLYING A LONG AND COSTLY WAR FOR ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

2. ON WAY WAR WILL END, DAYAN SAID:
(A) QUOTE, I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT, EVEN HAVING BEEN HIT SO HARD, SYRIA WILL WISH FOR AND AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE. IT MAY BE THAT SHE WILL WISH TO LEAVE THE OPTIONS OPEN AND THE ACTION UNFINISHED. IN VIEW OF THE MOBILIZATION OF THE ARAB WORLD, I AM NOT WILLING TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SIX-DAY WAR, -- NAMELY THAT, AFTER THE CRUSHING BLOW THEY RECEIVED, THEY REQUESTED A CEASEFIRE-- WILL OCCUR AGAIN. END QUOTE.
(B) QUOTE, IT MAY BE THAT THERE WILL BE NO PAPER SIGNED, BUT IF A SITUATION SHOULD ARISE WHEN THEY CAN NO LONGER PHYSICALLY OPEN FIRE, THEY WILL NOT START FIRING. THE QUESTION IS, ACTUALLY, WHAT REALITY WILL EXIST, AND NOT WHAT PIECE OF PAPER WILL, OR WILL NOT, BE SIGNED. END QUOTE.
(C) QUOTE, I AM NOT SURE THAT WHAT WE HAVE WITNESSED IN THE PAST, NAMELY THAT THE ARABS DO NOT WISH TO MAKE PEACE-- MAY NOT BE DEVELOPING INTO A FURTHER STAGE, MAINLY THAT THEY MAY NOT WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE A CEASEFIRE. THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE, BUT THEY REFUSED TO MAKE PEACE, IT MAY BE THAT NOW THEY MIGHT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

QUANDT

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NOT WISH TO ACCEPT A FORMAL CEASEFIRE. THUS, JUST AS IN THE PAST WE ENJOYED A STATED DE FACTO PEACE, THOUGH A BAL PEACE, WHICH THEY REFUSED TO TURN INTO A FORMAL PEACE, I THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT A SITUATION MAY ARISE IN WHICH THEY WILL NOT SIGN A CEASEFIRE, THOUGH FIRING WILL CEASE AS A RESULT OF THEIR INABILITY, NOT SO MUCH TO OPEN FIRE, BUT TO STAND UP AGAINST US IN ACTION. IN OTHER WORDS, SORT OF OPEN SITUATION, FOR A LONG TIME AT LEAST. END QUOTE.

3. ON PUNISHMENT ISRAEL WILL ADMINISTER TO ENEMY, DAYAN SAID: (A) QUOTE. IN EXACT -- TERMS, IT IS OUR AIM THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO CAUSE THEM TO BE HIT SO HARD THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO THINK OF WAR, AND SHOULD DESIRE A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END QUOTE.

(B) QUOTE. ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, THE DECISION HAS NOT YET FALLEN, AND I ASSUME THAT THE DECISION THERE WILL ALSO BE FAR MORE MEANINGFUL AND UNAMBIGUOUS... IN MY ESTIMATE IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE WE COME TO THE ACTUAL DECISIVE ARMOR BATTLE. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO BE AN EGYPTIAN AT THE END OF THAT DAY OF FIGHTING. END QUOTE.

(C) QUOTE. NOT ONLY ARE THE SYRIANS ALREADY DEFENDING DAMASCUS, BUT THERE WILL ALSO BE A SERIOUS, DECISIVE BATTLE IN EGYPT, WHICH WILL REMAIN IN THEIR MEMORIES, AND WHICH THEY SHALL NOT LOOK BACK TO WITH PLEASURE. END QUOTE.

4. ON LIKELY NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ISRAELI MOBILIZATION, DAYAN SAID:

(A) QUOTE. I DO THINK THAT IN THE LONG RUN WE OUGHT TO BE PREPARED FOR FAR HEAVIER MOBILIZATION, NOT ONLY OF OUR PEOPLE HERE IN ISRAEL, BUT ALSO OF THE WHOLE OF THE JEWISH NATION. END QUOTE.

(B) QUOTE. IN THIS SITUATION, AND WITH ALL THIS HEAVY HIGH TECHNOLOGY SOVIET SUPPORT, IT MAY BE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS A LONG TIME, AND WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DO SO -- BUT WE WILL ALSO NEED THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE ASSISTANCE OUR FRIENDS CAN GIVE US, NOT IN MEN BUT IN EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS THE SUPPORT OF THE JEWISH NATION AND OUR PEOPLE IN ISRAEL. END QUOTE.

5. OTHER MAIN TOPIC COVERED BY DAYAN, TO WHICH HE DEVOTED ROUGHLY HALF OF INTERVIEW, WAS IMPORTANT DOMESTIC ISSUE HERE OF WHETHER ISRAEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN BETTER MILITARY POSITION AT OUTBREAK OF WAR. HE HANDLED THIS WELL BY POINTING OUT THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFORDED ECONOMICALLY TO HAVE STAYED FULLY MOBILIZED FROM 1971 ON (BY WHICH TIME ARABS POSED REAL THREAT), OR POLITICALLY TO HAVE LAUNCHED PREVENTIVE WAR AT SOME POINT IN 1971-1973. QUOTE. WE DO NOT HAVE THAT MANY FRIENDS (ABROAD), AND IF WE HAD STARTED THE WAR, I DOUBT THAT WE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED APPLAUSE.

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SUPPORT, AND IDENTIFICATION WITH OUR CAUSE. END QUOTE.

6. DAYAN EXPLAINED ISRAEL DID JUST THE RIGHT THING IN 1971-1973: IT KEPT BUILDING UP INTO FINE FIGHTING FORCE. IN THIS ENDEAVOR, HE SAID ISRAEL HAD BEEN BY AND LARGE SUCCESSFUL, ALTHOUGH QUOTE THERE ARE THINGS WE DO NOT HAVE, THAT WE ASKED FOR AND DID NOT RECEIVE-- CERTAIN KINDS OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, PERSONAL EQUIPMENT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE, THAT THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY THE USSR, AND WE OURSELVES CANNOT PRODUCE AND HAVE NOT RECEIVED FROM ANYONE ELSE. END QUOTE. CRITICISM OF US WHICH SOME ISRAELIS MIGHT READ INTO THIS REMARK MUST HAVE BEEN CANCELLED BY "APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE". DAYAN WAS QUOTED OVER ISRAELI RADIO OCT 14 AS HAVING EXPRESSED IN ANOTHER INTERVIEW, WHEN ASKED ABOUT ADEQUACY OF US SUPPORT.

KEATING

BT

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